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UNITED STA TES 
SUPREME COURT 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 8196, 
No. 90-1912 (June 18, 1992). 
Proposition 13 Upheld 
On June 18, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld Proposition 13 against the equal 
protection challenge filed by the Center 
for Law in the Public Interest (CLIP!). 
[ 11: 1 CRLR 156-57 J The Court refused to 
apply the strict scrutiny test that is re-
quired when an alleged equal protection 
violation jeopardizes exercise of a fun-
damental right or categorizes on the basis 
of an inherently suspect characteristic; in 
the absence of heightened scrutiny, the 
Court applied a standard of review which 
asks only whether the difference in 
Proposition 13's property tax treatment 
between newer and older homeowners ra-
tionally furthers a legitimate state mterest. 
The Court had "no difficulty" finding "at 
least" two rational reasons for the dif-
ference in treatment: a legitimate state in-
terest in local neighborhood preservation, 
continuity, and stability, such as protec-
tion against gentrification; and the belief 
that the state legitimately can conclude 
that "a new owner at the time of acquiring 
his property does not have the same 
reliance interest warranting protection 
against higher taxes as does an existing 
owner .... [A]n existing owner rationally 
may be thought to have vested expecta-
tions in his property or home that are more 
deserving of protection than the an-
ticipatory expectations of a new owner at 
the point of purchase." 
The Court distinguished Allegheny 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 
488 U.S. 336 (1989), relied upon by 
Nordlinger, as a "rare case where the facts 
precluded any plausible inference that the 
reason for the unequal assessment practice 
was to achieve the benefits of an acquisi-
tion-value tax scheme." As to claims that 
Proposition 13 "frustrates the 'American 
Dream' of home ownership for many 
younger and poorer California families," 
the Court said that it does seem that 
"California's grand experiment appears to 
vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and 
entrenched segment of society, and, as the 
Court of Appeal surmised, ordinary 
democratic processes may be unlikely to 
prompt its reconsideration or repeal." 
Nonetheless, the Court was not inclined to 
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"upset the will of the people of California." 
In lone dissent, Justice Stevens argued 
that neither of the state interests cited by 
the majority meets the rational basis test. 
Although he agreed that neighborhood 
preservation is a legitimate state interest, 
Justice Stevens concluded that a tax 
windfall for all persons who purchased 
property prior to 1978 does not rationally 
further that interest; it is "too blunt a tool 
to accomplish such a specialized goal." As 
for the second rationale, "if ... a law creates 
a disparity, the State's interest preserving 
that disparity cannot be a 'legitimate state 
interest' justifying that inequity .... [A] 
statute's disparate treatment must be jus-
tified by a purpose distinct from the very 
effects created by that statute" (emphasis 
original). Stevens interpreted the Court's 
prior decisions as declaring irrational any 
attempt to treat similarly situated people 
differently on the basis of the date they 
joined a particular class. He stated that it 
would "obviously be unconstitutional to 
provide one with more or better fire or 
police protection than the other; it is just 
as plainly unconstitutional to require one 
to pay five times as much in property taxes 
as the other for the same government ser-
vices." 
New York v. United States, 
_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 8784, 
No. 91-543 (June 19, 1992). 
Waste Act Properly Allocates 
Power Between Federal and State 
Governments 
On June 19, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld a provision of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
Act of 1985 requiring states to either find 
a regional dump or build one of their own 
by January I, I 993. By a 9-0 vote, the 
Court ruled that the find-or-build require-
ment of the Act does not violate the tenth 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
which reserves to the states all powers not 
specifically granted to the federal govern-
ment in Article I of the Constitution. There 
is no violation because Congress gave the 
states a choice: "States may eitherregulate 
the disposal of radioactive waste ... by at-
taining local or regional self-sufficiency, 
or their residents who produce radioactive 
waste will be subject to federal regulation 
authorizing states [that have their own 
dumps] to deny access to their disposal 
sites." 
In another part of the same decision, 
the Court struck down the so-called "take 
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title" provision of the Act, which requires 
any state that does not have a disposal site 
to take ownership of and legal respon-
sibility for all low-level radioactive was-
tes produced in that state after 1996. The 
Court ruled that the "choice" here was 
between two unconstitutionally coercive 
alternatives: either accept ownership of 
the waste or regulate according to 
Congress' instructions. While it is proper 
for Congress to give states positive incen-
tives to take on a regulatory activity, "[n]o 
matter how powerful the federal interest 
involved, the Constitution simply does not 
give Congress the authority to require the 
states to regulate," wrote Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor for the 6-3 majority on this 
issue. Strong dissents were written by Jus-
tices White and Stevens with Justice 
Blackmun providing the other dissenting 
vote. Constitutional scholars noted that 
this decision marks only the second time 
since 1937 that the Court has struck down 
federal legislation on grounds it exceeds 
Congress' power under Article I of the 
Constitution. The tenth amendment is now 
a basis for declaring federal laws uncon-
stitutional. 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Assembly of the 
State of California v. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 
968 F.2d 916, 92 D.A.R. 15217, 
No. 92-15217 (July 1, 1992). 
Computer Tapes of 1990 Census 
Are Not Exempt from 
Freedom of Information Act 
In this proceeding, the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) appealed a decision of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of California requiring it to release 
computer tapes containing statistically ad-
justed figures from the 1990 census to the 
Assembly under the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. section 
552 et seq. 
Because statisticians have recognized 
that the decennial census undercounts the 
actual number of persons living in the 
United States, particularly among urban 
minority populations, the DOC's Census 
Bureau has developed a method to adjust 
for that undercount. Specifically, the 
Bureau starts with the actual enumeration 
resulting from the head count (the unad-
justed data), conducts a post-enumeration 
survey sampling 170,000 housing units, 
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and develops an adjustment factor which 
estimates the extent to which specific 
statistical categories were incorrectly 
counted in the initial enumeration, thus 
enabling the Bureau to produce an ad-
justed census. Although both the Under-
count Steering Committee within the Cen-
sus Bureau and the Director of the Census 
recommended that the adjusted census 
data be adopted as the official United 
States census, the DOC Secretary an-
nounced his decision not to adopt the ad-
justed census, stating that it had not been 
proven to be more accurate than the unad-
justed census. 
Following that announcement, the As-
sembly made a FOIA request for the for-
mulas used to create the adjusted census 
data, including "census population data 
for California, by block and census tract, 
broken down by race and age ... after ad-
justment in accordance with the post-
enumeration survey taken by the Bureau 
of the Census in 1990." DOC denied that 
request, contending that the tapes are 
protected by FOIA Exemption 5 's 
deliberative process privilege, 5 U.S.C. 
section 552(b )(5), which protects docu-
ments that are both "predecisional" and 
"deliberative." 
In considering whether the adjusted 
census tapes are predecisional, the court 
noted that a document may be considered 
predecisional if it was prepared in order to 
assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving 
at his/her decision. The court noted that 
DOC official Mark Plant had reviewed a 
sample of the adjusted data, but that 
sample was not released to the public "be-
cause it did not enter in any way direct or 
indirect into the Secretary's decision." 
The court found that "[m]aterial which 
predates a decision chronologically, but 
did not contribute to that decision, is not 
predecisional in any meaningful sense." 
Regarding DOC's claim that the tapes 
are "deliberative" material, the court 
noted that a useful rule of thumb in ex-
amining the deliberative process privilege 
requires the court to contrast "factual" and 
"deliberative" materials; the idea behind 
this distinction is that agencies have no 
legitimate interest in keeping the public 
ignorant of the facts from which the agen-
cies worked, while they do have a 
legitimate interest in shielding their 
preliminary opinions and explorations. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the district 
court had "analyzed the requested tapes to 
see where they fell along the continuum of 
deliberation and fact, and found that they, 
like the unadjusted census data from 
which they were derived, fell closer to fact 
and would not reveal the agency's protec-
table thought processes"; the Ninth Cir-
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cuit held that this finding was not clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision re-
quiring that the computer tapes be 
released to the Assembly; on September 
17, the Ninth Circuit rejected DOC's peti-
tion for rehearing and its request for 
rehearing en bane. 
Senate of the State of 
California v. U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 
968 F.2d 974, 92 D.A.R. 9363, 
No. 91-55887 (July 6, 1992). 
Senate Cannot Use Census Statutes 
or Constitution to Compel 
Discovery 
While the California Assembly was 
seeking disclosure of the computer tapes 
containing the adjusted census data 
through a FOIA request (see supra), the 
California Senate was attempting to ob-
tain the same information by contending 
that release is required by the Constitu-
tion, the census statutes (13 U.S.C. section 
I et seq.), and the Voting Rights Act (42 
U.S.C. section 1973); the Senate did not 
seek release of the tapes pursuant to FOIA. 
The U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California granted a prelimi-
nary injunction ordering the release of the 
adjusted census figures, concluding that 
the Senate would be irreparably harmed if 
not provided with the adjusted census cal-
culations for use in the state's redistricting 
process. The district court found no harm 
at all to the DOC, which had already cal-
culated and prepared the adjusted figures, 
and had even been ready to send them out 
to the states. 
The Senate argued that because the 
Constitution provides for a census based 
upon an "actual Enumeration" of the 
people in this country, there is a right to an 
accurate count. Moreover, the Senate ar-
gued that because Congress delegated the 
task of taking the census to the DOC 
Secretary and directed the Secretary to 
produce the census report data to the Presi-
dent and the states, the State of California 
is entitled to the adjusted census informa-
tion. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the Secretary has in fact 
conducted the census and reported the 
results, as required by law. The court con-
cluded that neither the census statutes nor 
the Constitution offer a basis for the 
Senate's demands, noting that the Senate 
is attempting "to use the Constitution and 
the census statutes as freedom of informa-
tion laws so that it can obtain release of 
that governmental data." The court added 
that "[w]hile Congress can undoubtedly 
direct release of information, .. .it has not 
done so in the census statutes." 
The Senate also argued that the Voting 
Rights Act imposes an implied duty on the 
DOC Secretary to prevent "the implemen-
tation of voting changes (e.g., redistrict-
ings) that would have a 'retrogressive' 
effect upon minority voting rights in cer-
tain jurisdictions, including four counties 
in California." According to the court, 
"[i]f the State knows that the census data 
is [sic] underrepresentati ve, it can, and 
should, utilize noncensus data in addition 
to the official count in its redistricting 
process." Ignoring the fact that this was 
the purpose for the Senate's attempt to 
obtain DO C's adjusted data, the court con-
cluded that "[i]t is the state's respon-
sibility, and not the Secretary's, to satisfy 
the mandates of the Voting Rights Act." 
Although acknowledging that "large num-
bers of Blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific 
Islanders, and Native Americans were 
missed" by the unadjusted census data, the 
court concluded that none of the laws 
relied upon by the Senate give it the nght 
to compel the Secretary to release the 
tapes. 
In a terse dissent, Justice Harry Preger-
son commented that the official 1990 cen-
sus data missed over five million people, 
one million of whom reside in California. 
Pregerson opined that "[b]y refusing to 
disclose the adjusted census data, the 
Secretary may have impermissibly inter-
fered with the Senate's duty to redistrict 
congressional and state legislative seats 
under the United States Constitution and 
under the Voting Rights Act. As the 
majority points out, .. .it is for the state to 
satisfy the mandates of the Voting Rights 
Act.. . .lt is not for us, nor for the Census 
Bureau, to decide whether the data will aid 
California in its attempt to comply with 
the Voting Rights Act or to correct inequi-
ties in its redistricting." Pregerson added 
that "the Senate and the public will be 
irreparably injured by denying the re-
quested preliminary injunction. This in-
jury far outweighs any possible injury the 
Secretary may suffer." 
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UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Gomez v. Gates, 
_F.Supp._, 92 D.A.R. 10875, 
No. CV 90-0856 JSL 
(July 31, 1992). 
Attorneys in Undesirable Cases 
Are Eligible For Lodestar Amount 
Plus Multiplier Fees 
In this proceeding, the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District considered 
whether attorneys who provide successful 
representation in "undesirable cases" are 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees 
using the lodestar method (multiplying the 
number of hours reasonably expended on 
the matter by a reasonable hourly rate) and 
a multiplier (a number by which the lodes-
tar would be multiplied to determine the 
final fee). 
The court noted that although the U.S. 
Supreme Court's recent decision in City of 
Burlington v. Dague, 60 U.S.L.W. 4717 
( 1992), held that there may be no enhan-
cement of a fee award beyond the lodestar 
amount to reflect the fact that a party's 
attorneys were retained on a contingent 
fee basis, that decision did not address 
whether the undesirability of a case may 
be a basis for enhancing a fee otherwise 
determined by a simple lodestar calcula-
tion; the court defined the term "un-
desirable cases" as those in which the 
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail for reasons 
having nothing to do with the merits of the 
claim or the quality of the attorney's per-
formance. For example, the court com-
mented that in some civil rights cases, 
"primarily those involving use of alleged-
ly excessive force by police against unat-
tractive plaintiffs ... it is extremely difficult 
for the plaintiff to prevail, and virtually 
impossible to obtain a recovery large 
enough to support a reasonable fee. This 
is so regardless of the merits of the claim, 
or the skill, experience or diligence of 
counsel....Jurors have no desire to believe 
criminals, or to reward them even if the 
jurors chance to believe their stories." 
The court found support for this con-
tention in the facts of the underlying ac-
tion for which the attorneys were request-
ing fees. In that action, the Los Angeles 
Police Department's Special Investigation 
Section witnessed four people robbing a 
McDonald's restaurant. After allowing the 
suspects to get into their vehicle, the of-
ficers boxed in that vehicle with police 
cars and proceeded to fire approximately 
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twenty shotgun rounds into the car, a large 
numberofwhich struck the suspects. After 
this initial barrage, one officer shot and 
killed one of the suspects who was at-
tempting to flee the scene; another officer 
shot a second suspect, who was already 
fatally or near-fatally wounded, through 
the top of the head from a distance of two 
feet; the same officer then shot another 
suspect (the only one to survive) in the 
stomach from a distance of about eighteen 
inches; and another officer then shot the 
fourth suspect, who also was already fa-
tally or near-fatally wounded, from ap-
proximately the same distance. In a law-
suit filed by the one surviving suspect and 
the survivors of the three dead suspects, 
the jury held liable all of the officers who 
fired shots and former Los Angeles Police 
Chief Daryl Gates; however, the jury 
awarded no compensatory damages and 
awarded a total of $44,000 in punitive 
damages to the plaintiffs. 
The court found that because it is dif-
ficult for plaintiffs in unattractive cases to 
prevail for reasons unrelated to the relative 
merits of the claim or to the difficulties in 
establishing those merits which are or-
dinarily reflected in the lodestar, a fee 
computation which considers only those 
two factors is not reasonable and will not 
attract lawyers to take those cases. Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that a mul-
tiplier of 1.75 must be used to reflect the 
peculiarly undesirable nature of this case 
from the standpoint of a lawyer who 
regularly accepts employment on a con-
tingent fee basis. 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME 
COURT 
Christopher v. Fair Political 
Practices Commission, 
No. S025815, 92 D.A.R. 11630 
(Aug. 20, 1992). 
Court Agrees to Hear Petition to 
Resurrect Proposition 68 
On August 20, the California Supreme 
Court granted review of California Com-
mon Cause's petition for a writ of mandate 
seeking reinstatement of Proposition 68, 
the campaign financing reform measure 
passed by the voters in 1988. Proposition 
68 (which included campaign contribu-
tion limits, expenditure limits, and a 
public financing mechanism for statewide 
and legislative races) was held inoperative 
in its entirety by the California Supreme 
Court in 1990 because a competing 
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measure, Proposition 73, had garnered a 
larger majority. Reinstatement of Proposi-
tion 68 became a possibility when the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a district court decision that major 
portions of Proposition 73's campaign 
financing "reforms" unconstitutionally 
discriminate against electoral challengers. 
[/2:2&3CRLR 273-74; 11:1 CRLR 153; 
8:2 CRLR I] 
CALIFORNIA COURTS 
OF APPEAL 
Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 
7 Cal.App.4th 1130, 92 D.A.R. 
9230, No. B063688 
(June 30, 1992). 
Palmdale City Council Followed 
Improper Closed Session 
Procedure 
At the request of the Palmdale City 
Council, the City's attorney prepared a 
memorandum discussing an appeal from a 
decision of the City's Planning Commis-
sion. Without first stating publicly its in-
tent to do so, the City Council considered 
its attorney's memorandum in a closed 
session and refused to disclose it to plain-
tiff, an interested party. Plaintiff con-
tended that the Council's efforts to keep 
the memorandum confidential violated 
both the Ralph M. Brown Act, Govern-
ment Code section 54950 et seq., and the 
Public Records Act, Government Code 
section 6250 et seq. 
In considering whether the City's ac-
tions violated the Brown Act, the Second 
District Court of Appeal noted that the 
Brown Act "compels public agencies to 
conduct their business openly." and that 
writings distributed to the members of a 
city council by an employee or agent of 
the counci I for discussion or consideration 
at a public meeting are public records 
under the Public Records Act unless the 
writing is exempt from public disclosure 
under specified sections of the Public 
Records Act. The court acknowledged that 
under Government Code section 6254(k), 
disclosure is not required of records "the 
disclosure of which is exempted or 
prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, 
including, but not limited to, provisions of 
the Evidence Code relating to privilege." 
Although agreeing that the memorandum 
qualifies as a confidential communication 
between lawyer and client within the 
meaning of the attorney-client privilege, 
the court noted that the analysis does not 
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end there. Instead, the court found that the 
Council's "decision to address the issue in 
a closed session on the ground it relates to 
pending Ii ligation and is therefore 
privileged must be made and announced 
publicly prior to the closed session. This 
procedure was not followed" (emphasis 
original). 
The court also rejected the City's argu-
ment that the memorandum is exempt as 
the attorney's work product unrelated to 
litigation, finding that "[c]ommunications 
between the City Council and its attorney 
unrelated to 'pending litigation' within the 
meaning of section 54956.9 must be dis-
closed (unless exempted for some other 
unrelated reason) and cannot be withheld 
in reliance upon some perceived permea-
tion of the attorney-client relationship." 
The court concluded that had the 
Council complied with the Brown Act by 
publicly announcing prior to the public 
hearing its intent to consider the 
memorandum in a closed session, the 
memorandum would not be subject to dis-
closure. The court hrld that, in this case, 
the Council's failure to comply with the 
statutorily compelled procedure con-
stitutes a waiver of the pending litigation 
privilege, and ordered that a writ of man-
date be gramed compelling the Council to 
disclose the memorandum. 
The California Supreme Court granted 
the City of Palmdale's petition for review 
on October 1. 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., v. 
Orange County Employees 
Retirement System Board of 
Directors, 
9 Cal.App.4th 134, 92 D.A.R. 
12312, No. G011490 
(Aug. 31, 1992). 
Brown Act Requires Committee 
Meetings of a Retirement System 
to be Open to the Public 
In this proceeding, the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal considered the proper 
interpretation of the Brown Act as it ap-
plies to the Orange County Employees 
Retirement System's board of directors' 
committee meetings. The court initially 
noted that the Brown Act requires all 
meetings of the legislative body of a local 
agency to be open and public. The Act 
includes several definitions of the term 
"legislative body," including "[a]ny ad-
visory commission, advisory committee 
or advisory body of a local agency, created 
by charter, ordinance, resolution, or by 
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any similar formal action of a legislative 
body or member of a legislative body of a 
local agency." The court found that there 
is no doubt that the retirement system's 
board of directors, which consists of nine 
members, falls within at least two of the 
Act's definitions of the term "legislative 
body." 
However, the dispute in this case is 
whether the board's four-person commit-
tees also fall within the definition. The 
court noted that if the committees are ad-
visory, they would fall under the definition 
of the term "legislative body" contained in 
Government Code section 54952.3; how-
ever, language at the end of that section 
exempts from its definition a committee 
composed solely of members of the 
governing body of a local agency which 
are less than a quorum of such governing 
body. It is upon this proviso that the retire-
ment board relies in denying public access 
to its committee meetings. 
However, the court found that the 
board's committees also fall within the 
scope of Government Code section 
54952, which defines the term "legislative 
body" to include "any board, commission, 
committee, or other body on which of-
ficers of a local agency serve in their offi-
cial capacity as members and which is 
supported in whole or in part by funds 
provided by such agency, whether such 
board, commission, committee or other 
body is organized and operated by such 
local agency or by a private corporation." 
Noting that the "less-than-a-quorum" ex-
ception contained in section 54952.3 
"does nothing to affect bodies that fall 
within the definition of 'legislative body' 
under section 54952," the court held that 
meetings of the various committees of the 
board must be open to the public under the 
terms of the Brown Act. 
The board intends to appeal the Fourth 
District's decision. 
* 
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